Introduction
In the common assessment, the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention, ECHR) 2 is the treaty basis of one of the most effective human rights protection systems in the world. (Keller & Sweet, 2008, p. 3) . Travaux Préparatoires show that the idea of a European treaty of human rights and fundamental freedoms, combined with the mechanism of "ensuring respect for obligations arising for State Parties to the Conventions", at the helm with the European Commission on Human Rights (Commission, EComHR) 3 and the European Court of Human Rights (Court, ECtHR), 4 sprang from the profound conviction of common democratic values in post-war Europe being threatened. (Morawska, 2016, pp. 15-19 ) . This was prompted, first of all, by the dramatic events of World War II, marked by unimaginable contempt for human life and dignity on an alarming scale. (Reiss, 2009, p. 293) . Therefore, the Convention was to function as a sort of alarm system that was supposed to prevent and warn the state about progressing down Robertson (1963) "a road which leads far, sometimes even to Buchenwald or Dachau" (p. 6). On the other hand, that sense of looming threat was compounded by the increasingly stronger position of the Soviet Union and the "spreading of communism" in Europe. (Gordon & Leach, 2012, p. 26 ) . Therefore, the preparatory works were accompanied, as put by Bates (2010) and Moravcsik (2000) , by "fear of the return of fascism or, in fact, fear of the coming communism" (p. 219, & p. 6) . For these reasons, the Convention was designed as a legally binding instrument of collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms. ("P. H. Teitgen's", 1975, pp. 292-294) . In light of these remarks, it is understandable that Art. 2 of the Convention, constituting the right to life, is considered one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention. Together with Art. 3, constituting the prohibition of torture, 5 it is to express one of the basic values of a democratic society, for the protection of which the Council of Europe was appointed. 6 However, Strasbourg case law shows that the original conditions of the Convention works have gradually lost their relevance. Consequently, the historical interpretation has been 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms/Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales (CETS No. 005); The Convention was opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950, and after obtaining the required ten ratifications, it entered into force on 3 December 1953. 3 Following the changes introduced by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the Court has become the only and full-time judicial body of the Convention. It was opened for signature on 11 May 1994 and entered into force on 1 November 1998 (ETS No. 155) . 4 This mechanism is closely connected with the mechanism of supervision over the implementation by States Parties to the Convention of the Court's judgments. According to Art. 46 of the Convention, this supervision is exercised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 5 As of 1998, Art. 3 of the Convention is entitled "prohibition of torture". (Cf. Art. 2 para. 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR -the titles of individual chapters and articles -in the Annex to this protocol). Nevertheless, in the case law in relation to Art. 3, the term "ill-treatment" is used, which is related to the distinction between three forms of prohibited treatment or punishment under Art. 3: torture, inhuman treatment or punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment. Thus, the gradation of prohibited forms of treatment and punishment was adopted: from the most cruel and disgraceful to the milder form, causing not so much pain and suffering but a sense of fear and humiliation. 6 pushed into the background and the dynamic (evolutionary) interpretation gained a domination position. 7 The directives of the last interpretation require that the Convention be regarded as a living instrument and therefore its provisions are to be interpreted in the light of present day conditions. 8 This is intended to help the Court in order to adequately respond to the changes of national and international legislation . As a result, the fact that relevant issue was not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention cannot prevent the Court from falling it within the scope of the Convention, hence including it in the material scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 9
One of the effects of the dynamic interpretation of the Convention is the Court's determination of the preventive dimension of the obligations of States Parties in the field of protection of the right to life. This dimension is the result of a long process of the interpretation of the Convention by the Court. The main purpose of this article is to properly show this process and assess its effects. The starting point of this analysis is the thesis that the preventive dimension of the obligation to protect life is related to the Court's development of the positive obligations of states under the Art. 2 of the Convention. Next, the types of obligations that the Tribunal has defined in this dimension of the protection of the right to life, together with the characteristics of their subject will be presented, namely the prevention of materialization of life threat. Finally, the criteria for the Court's assessment of the fulfillment of these different obligations by States Parties will be analyzed. This will be done with particular focus on the principle of due diligence. The homogeneity of the subject matter of obligations under the Convention for States Parties, and thus their internal structure and functions, was questioned by the judicial bodies of the Convention as early as the late 1960s, first by the Commission and later by the Court. (Sudre, 2003 , p. 228, & Xenos, 2011 . In the course of the interpretation and application of the Convention, these bodies began to derive positive obligations for States Parties from the Convention standards protecting human and political rights and freedoms, with negative obligations remaining in the foreground as primary obligations. In other words, the original obligations towards States
Parties of the Convention are, above all, negative obligations, 13 whereas positive obligations have been added to them and supplement them. 1415 Consequently, their indirect normative bases are commonly accentuated, 15 often being described as implied obligations. (Dijk, 1998 , pp. 17-33, Klatt, 2011 , pp. 691-718, Mowbray, 2004 , p. 100 et seq., Mowbray, 2010 , pp. 289-317, Xenos, 2011 Positive obligations are linked to all human rights and fundamental freedoms, but they have been exceptionally well developed for three rights in particular. Among these rights, the right to respect for private and family life is of particular importance (Art. 8 of the Convention), for which the first judgments were passed, in which the judicial bodies of the Convention drew attention to positive obligations. (Morawska, 2016, pp. 89-92) . The other two rights are the prohibition of illtreatment (Art. 3 of the Convention) and the right to life (Art. 2 of the Convention), respectively.
The types of state obligations linked to the right to life
For the issues outlined in the title of this paper, the most important are the positive obligations derived from Art. 2 of the Convention. In relation to them, emphasis should first be placed on the first sentence in the first paragraph of the Article, according to which the right of every person to life is protected by law, given that it is referred to as a normative justification for positive obligations. For the first time, the Court interpreted it as such explicitly in the case of L. 12 The very title of the Convention suggests that individual freedom is its fundamental idea. 13 -III, p. 1403 . It is common ground that the State's obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. It is thus accepted by those appearing before the Court that Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain welldefined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.
The above findings prove that Strasbourg case law identifies two general types of actions that States Parties are obliged to undertake in order to fulfill their positive obligations: actions in the area of national law and actions in the area of their implementation. In the case of the right to life, these two areas are not equivalent, since the obligation to ensure the protection of the right to life, by means of appropriate legal provisions, is recognized as a primary obligation, and therefore primordial and superior. It can be assumed that this results from its direct normative justification.
On the other hand, it is clear that the Court has not limited the protection of the right to life strictly to the provisions of law, but additionally pointed to the obligation to provide them with real effectiveness in practice, 19 and has consistently imposed on States Parties an obligation to design enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches (violations) of provisions. 20 At the same time, the obligation to establish the enforcement machinery of internal law has a complex internal structure. First of all, it is an obligation to establish an appropriate mechanism to enforce these provisions in the area of preventing, suppressing and sanctioning any violation of these provisions. 21 The recipient of this obligation is the national legislator, who is to create a legal framework for the establishment of the machinery and a separate framework for its operation in practice. The very use of this machinery constitutes a separate obligation. 22
The most important mechanism for the conducted analysis is the prevention of breaches of legal provisions protecting the right to life. The Court's rulings in the case of Osman v. the UK of 1998, cited above, show that it is essential to take appropriate preventive measures to protect a person whose life is threatened by another person. Anticipating the detailed remarks, it should be emphasized that acts of violation of the right to life made by private persons, cf. Dipla (1994) , Dröge (2003) , Spielmann (1998) p. 169; p. 374 ), but they may constitute, cf. Crawford (2002) and Pisillo , "only an external fact that gives rise to another unlawful act, effected by the state itself and stemming from failure to comply with the obligation to prevent such actions or punishment by state authorities" (pp. 874-890; p. 26) . 23 The essence of this "other unlawful act" of the state is, thus, to refrain from taking the required actions. Consequently, as aptly pointed out by Sudre (1995) , it is not the conduct of the individual that may be the subject of charges before the ECtHR, but the behavior of the authorities of State Party that has not taken appropriate measures to prevent such violations, analyzed in terms of negligence (p. 374).
The significance of this positive obligation is undisputed in Strasbourg case law. In defining its subject, the Court states that it means to "take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction". 24 Importantly, the set of potential threats to the right to life requiring these steps is not closed, because in the Court's assessment " [. . .] this obligation is to be interpreted and applied in the context of any activity, whether public or private, in connection with which the right to life may be threatened". 25
3 Types of preventive obligations related to the right to life Although the Court investigated the case with reference to Art. 2 of the Convention, it was not done in the light of positive obligations, but in the light of the criterion of the absolute necessity to use lethal force. It was determined that, due to the criterion in question, the circumstances in which lethal force may be used must be subject to restrictive interpretation 32 and an extremely accurate assessment, within which not only actions of state officials who actually used lethal force must be taken into account, but all surrounding circumstances as well. 33 In doing so, the Court combined the new premise with the criterion of the absolute necessity of using lethal force. A review of the case law shows that it is of particular importance, and in fact, leads to the redefinition of the criterion of absolute necessity. Importantly, so far the Court has neither stated its substance precisely nor enumerated situations which it considers to be "all circumstances surrounding the use of this lethal force". The Court did, however, indicate its basic assumption that, in a democratic society, law enforcement officials should "exercise certain caution in the use of firearms, even during actions undertaken against persons suspected of terrorism" 34 . This was later linked to specific obligations, including the obligation to develop a plan of action for using lethal force, the obligation 28 to properly supervise its course, 35 the obligation to sufficiently respect the protection of the right to life in instructions given to officials regarding the use of lethal force, 36 and in particular, the exclusion of the instruction shoot to kill 37 and the obligation to properly train or instruct officials so that they can assess whether there really is an absolute necessity to use firearms in a given situation. 38 The performance of these obligations requires a number of specific actions that have a preventive function (Pisillo Mazzeschi, 2008, p. 398) , and as such, are aimed at "minimizing, to the largest possible extent, the use of lethal force". 39 It should be noted that they do not exhaust possible preventive measures. In conclusion to its findings, the Court ruled that having regard to the decision not to prevent the suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the failure of the authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that their intelligence assessments might, in some respects at least, be erroneous and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when the soldiers opened fire, the Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2 para. 2 (a) of the Convention. 40 The direction of change in the planning and supervision of law enforcement operations, as indicated in the case of McCann and Others of 1995, 41 was maintained in subsequent cases. 42 Their analysis clearly shows that the Court has been gradually expanding the scope and subject matter of these obligations, as evidenced e.g. by the case of Wasilewska and Kalucka v. Poland of 2010, which implies that law enforcement officials joining the action with the use of lethal force must wear an obvious identification mark, so that there is no doubt as to them being law enforcement officials.
In addition, the authorities, "by planning an action involving a large number of law enforcement officials and an unknown number of suspects" were obliged to provide an ambulance on the spot. 43
In turn, in the case of Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus of 1997, the Court for the first time drew attention to the obligation of planning and control of the rescue operation. 44 The subject Joaçaba , v. 20, n. 2, p. 233-250, jul./dez. 2019 of this obligation may be related to the one formulated in the case of Ergi v. Turkey of 1998, that is that of avoiding and, in any event, minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life. 45 To show the structure of this obligation, it is necessary to distinguish at least three types of action (operations).
A distinction should be made between a rescue operation consisting in the evacuation of individuals during a typical police action and a rescue operation that requires planning and carrying out a mass evacuation of individuals whose lives are at risk in a given situation, and then, the act of evacuating civilians from areas affected by armed conflict. 46 Thus, the scope of this obligation to act was not limited to typical police operations. The Court drew attention to the obligation to carry out these last types of rescue operations in many cases against Russia, in Dröge (2003, p. 46) , Mowbray (2004, p. 13) and Pisillo Mazzeschi (2008, p. 399) . 46 It should be emphasized that in the case of the latter action, the Court's findings clearly enter into the sphere of international humanitarian law and give rise to important critical remarks. See Jachec-Neale (2010, p. 119-142) . 47 Isayeva v. Russia, No. 57950/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, paras. 170-171. 48 Isayeva v. Russia, No. 57950/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, para. 199 . Similar conclusions were drawn for Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, No. 27065/05, judgment of 2 December 2010, para. 203. criminal prevention sensu stricto, but it refers instead to a whole range of different organizational, technical and tactical measures, including tactics and techniques of prevention and intervention of broadly understood police and preventive services, special forces and the military. In all this, the multidimensional protective function of these measures is important. 49 30). 52 Therefore, when assessing the case of Finogenov and Others v. Russia and the operation of Russian services and special forces, whose aim was to release about 900 hostages from the Moscow Dubrovka theater building, 53 the Court determined that it is about taking such measures that are "feasible" in the circumstances. 54 As a result of the above optimization, the degree of performance of the protection obligations analyzed may vary (Dröge, 2003, p. 310) , although it must be the highest possible. 55
In the assessment of taking the measures in question, their operational aspect is extremely important, which results in obvious "difficulties in maintaining order in contemporary societies, unpredictability of human behavior and decisions during action (operational decisions) in relation to its primary objectives and feasible measures". 56 In assessing the undertaking of operational preventive measures, a certain randomness is allowed, and thus the possibility of occurrence of accidental, completely unpredictable circumstances. 57 This, in turn, makes them made bear some risk of non-performance. (Pisillo Mazzeschi, 2008, p. 285) . Therefore, the Court allows for an 49 The measures required by the Court are aptly described by A. Mowbray as protective police measures. Mowbray (2004, p. 15) . 50 More about the specific nature of the obligation to protect in the legal order of the ECHR and the distinctiveness of their typology in relation to the concept of tripartie typology, i.e. obligation to respect, obligation to protect and obligation to fulfill, see Morawska (2016, pp. 179-187 Reports 2007, p. 43. 53 In this case, the applicants were either hostages or relatives of hostages who died in the course of the action undertaken by the Russian services or died later due to wounds. 54 Finogenov and Others v. Russia of 2011, para. 209. 55 For this reason, e.g. in Dodov v. Bulgaria of 2008, it stated that "in a situation where there is no doubt that the police could do more in a given case, the decisive question is whether its response was appropriate to the circumstances, including specific facts and real conditions of everyday police work". See. Dodov v. Bulgaria of 2008, para. 101. 56 Makaratzis v. Greece, No. 50385/99, judgment of 20 December 2004, para. 69. 57 This unpredictability in the work of law enforcement officials also exists today, despite the development of new technologies and police techniques, because these services face new challenges that were not even foreseeable in the course of work on the Convention; see the findings in erroneous assessment of the absolute necessity to use lethal force at a given moment, as long as it was based on a "sincere belief which, for important reasons [at the time of making the decision to use this force], could be considered right, but which then turned out to be wrong". 58
As far as operational preventive measures are concerned, which State Party to the Convention is obliged to undertake in order to implement the horizontal obligation to protect, the Court refers to them as being appropriate or reasonable and appropriate. Therefore, certain flexibility is assumed, which is to help State Parties adjust their specific form to the conditions of the case.
Considering that it is a matter of choosing appropriate and reasonable measures, the rational assessment of factual and legal possibilities indispensable in this case manifests itself in the fact that many external factors, often independent of the state's operation, influence the choice of these measures in a particular case. Accordingly, State Party is required to exercise due diligence in seeking to ensure effective protection to the right to life (Art. 2 of the Convention) to the largest extent a given situation allows it.
If one were to refer these findings to the general criterion of appropriateness and reasonableness of the operational measures required, it becomes obvious that they cannot be means that result in unfeasible or disproportionate burdens for the authorities. 59 In this way, an important criterion for the fulfillment of obligations resulting from civil and political rights, among them notably the right to life, becomes the criterion of due diligence, which has traditionally been associated with progressive obligations related to economic, social and cultural rights. (International Law Association, 2014, p. 14 et seq).
This conclusion, however, requires a significant supplementation. First, the obligation of due diligence does not refer to negative obligations, the object of which can be reduced to refraining from unlawful and arbitrary interference with human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to life. (Pisillo Mazzeschi, 1992, p. 22, 25 e 46 2016, paras. 244-248, and especially Toubache v. France, No. 19510/15, judgment of 7 June 2018, para. 37; Pisillo Mazzeschi (1992, p. 48) and Schutter (2012, p. 414 of lethal force". 61 Although the catalog of these means is open, they have been explicitly indicated by the Court. As a result, the state has a relatively small margin in means-selecting. For example, State Party joining an action involving the use of lethal force is obliged to develop a plan of such action.
Its lack may be in breach of Art. 2 of the Convention. A similar reasoning applies to the provision of an ambulance at the scene of the action or proper training of officials. Elements of optimization or reasonableness of orders emerge only at the stage of operation, i.e. taking direct action with a view to performing a specific task. This is confirmed, for example, by the findings of the Court in the case of Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy of 2011, according to which, in a situation where officials do not recourse to lethal force against a precise and identifiable target, as was in the case of McCann and Others, but for "keeping order in the face of riots that could have spread [. . .] throughout the city, one cannot expect all officials participating in this action are perfectly trained in dealing with the task entrusted to them". 62 Second, as indicated above, not all types of specific obligations under the obligation to protect the right to life (Art. 2 of the Convention) have in their structure "the element of diligence1". 63 In other words, the content of the obligation to protect the right to life, both horizontally and vertically, consists of many different duties, only a few of which are duties of due diligence. For example, the obligation to protect the right to life in a horizontal dimension requires, first of all, establishing appropriate, effective criminal law provisions to prevent crimes against a person (legislative obligation), then establishing appropriate mechanisms for enforcing these provisions at the level of preventing, suppressing and prosecuting the offenders of these violations. 64 In the structure of the aforementioned obligations, there is no requirement of due diligence, as they are obligations outcome-related and immediate, and therefore require prompt execution. 65 The obligation of due diligence emerges only at the stage of using these mechanisms in practice, including via operational preventive or precautionary means. (Dröge, 2003, p. 290 et seq.) . 66
Conclusion
Due diligence is a constitutive element of the good faith principle. A State is acting in good faith if, despite due diligence in the actions taken, it could not fulfill its obligations. On the contrary, if the state does not exercise due diligence, it is acting in bad faith. Joaçaba, v. 20, n. 2, p. 233-250, jul./dez. 2019 In line with popular opinion, it was H. Grocjusz who laid the foundations for the concept of due diligence in international law (Dröge, 2003, p. 292) , while the field of international law from which this concept originates is the protection of foreign citizens and representatives of foreign states. (Dröge, 2003, p. 291; Pisillo Mazzeschi, 1992, pp. 22-36) . At present, reference to this concept can be found also in other branches of international law, including the protection of human rights. (Barnidge, 2005, pp. 103-125; Koivurova, 2013, nb 33) . It has been gradually gaining the status of one of the basic principles of international law (Condorelli, 1989, p. 233-246; Barnidge, 2006, p. 64) . As we know, it played a key role in the first phase of the works of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the codification of the principles of state responsibility for unlawful acts. (Koivurova, 2013, nb 4, 9, 27) . The wide application of the concept of due diligence is largely due to its flexibility, which allows it to be adapted to the specifics of a given branch of international law and a specific case, because its content depends to a large extent on the circumstances of the case. 67 The analysis of international practice in the field of human rights protection shows that, originally, the concept of due diligence was invoked only in the context of preventive and investigative actions of the authorities, required in the event of violations of human rights by third parties (Koivurova, 2013, nb. 31; Pisillo Mazzeschi, 2008, p. 493; ) . The preventive, and at the same time protective, context of the concept of due diligence, having its historical sources, can also be observed in the most recent international case law. 68 This relationship seems to arise from the specificity of the areas in which the state takes action of this type, in which case arriving at the outcome would be very difficult, and certainly could not be fully guaranteed. 69 In this case, the expectation of due diligence from the State was, and is, a certain rational necessity. Nevertheless, the requirement of due diligence increasingly often necessitates going beyond the scope of preventive measures to suppress violations of human rights by private individuals, 70 as a result of which the concept of due diligence also applies to actions to prevent human rights violations undertaken in the vertical dimensions. Consequently, States are obliged to protect persons under their jurisdiction over the actions of their own bodies (officials), which are not unlawful prima facie. 71 The above process of extending the scope of due diligence can be observed in Strasbourg case law. It seems that it was initiated in the case of McCann and has been consistently upheld by the Court. 72 As a result of this process, the findings of the present case now have the status of general principles. 73 It should therefore go without saying that States Parties to the Convention nowadays have a duty to act diligently in certain situations so as to "minimize, to the greatest possible extent, the use of lethal force or accidental deaths". 74 In other words, States Parties were obliged to "make every effort" to fulfill this obligation, while assuming that there could be reasons for an objective inability to do so, as a number of highly uncertain, random factors are at play 75 .
However, it should be borne in mind that in assessing the State's due diligence in a given case, the Court has consistently taken into account "the ever-higher standard required in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms [. . .] and demonstrates increasingly more determination in assessing violations of the basic values of a democratic society". 76 There is, thus, no single, constant, required level of due diligence. Not only that, it is also being constantly increased. The analysis of Strasbourg case law shows that this applies in full to the actions taken by States Parties in the implementation of the obligation to protect the right to life.
